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Abstract
In voting contexts, some new candidates may show up in the course of the process. In this case, we may
want to determine which of the initial candidates are possible winners, given that a fixed number k of new
candidates will be added. We give a computational study of this problem, focusing on scoring rules, and we
provide a formal comparison with related problems such as control via adding candidates or cloning.
1 Introduction
In many real-life collective decision making situations, the set of candidates (or alternatives) may vary while
the voting process goes on, and may change at any time before the decision is final: some new candidates may
join, whereas some others may withdraw. This, of course, does not apply to situations where the vote takes
place in a very short period of time (such as, typically, political elections in most countries), and neither does
the addition of new candidates during the process apply to situations where the law forbids new candidates
to be introduced after the voting process has started (which, again, is the case for most political elections).
However, there are quite many practical settings where this may happen, especially situations where votes are
sent by email during an extended period of time. This is typically the case when making a decision about the
date and time of a meeting. In the course of the process, we may learn that the room is taken at a given time
slot, making this time slot no longer a candidate. The opposite case also occurs frequently; we thought the
room was taken on a given date and then we learn that it has become available, making this time slot a new
candidate.
The paper focuses on candidate addition only. More precisely, the class of situations we consider is the
following. A set of voters have expressed their votes about a set of (initial) candidates. Then some new
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candidates declare their intention to participate in the election. The winner will ultimately be determined using
some given voting rule and the voters’ preferences over the set of all candidates. In this class of situations, an
important question arises: who among the initial candidates can still be a winner once the voters’ preferences
about all candidates are known? This is important in particular if there is some interest to detect as soon
as possible the candidates who are not possible winners: for instance, candidates for a job may have the
opportunity to apply for different positions, and time slots may be released for other potential meetings.
This question is strongly related to several streams of work in the recent literature on computational social
choice, especially the problem of determining whether the vote elicitation process can be terminated [10, 29];
the possible winner problem, and more generally the problem of applying a voting rule to incomplete prefer-
ences [22, 26, 30, 5, 6] or uncertain preferences with probabilistic information [20]; swap bribery, encompass-
ing the possible winner problem as a particular case [15]; voting with an unknown set of available candidates
[25]; the control of a voting rule by the chair via adding candidates; and resistance to cloning—we shall come
back to the latter two problems in more detail in the related work section.
Clearly, considering situations where new voters are added is a specific case of voting under incomplete
preferences, where incompleteness is of a very specific type: the set of candidates is partitioned in two groups
(the initial and the new candidates), and the incomplete preferences consist of complete rankings on the initial
candidates. This class of situations is, in a sense, dual to a class of situations that has been considered more
often, namely, when the set of voters is partitioned in two groups: those voters who have already voted,
and those who have not expressed their votes yet. The latter class of situations, while being a subclass of
voting under incomplete preferences, has been more specifically studied as a coalitional manipulation problem
[11, 18], where the problem is to determine whether it is possible for the voters who have not voted yet to make
a given candidate win. Varying sets of voters have also been studied in the context of compiling the votes of
a subelectorate [8, 31]: there, one is interested in summarizing a set of initial votes, while still being able to
compute the outcome once the remaining voters have expressed their votes.
The layout of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we recall the necessary background on voting and
we introduce some notation. In Section 3 we state the problem formally, by defining voting situations where
candidates may be added after the votes over a subset of initial candidates have already been elicited. In the
following sections we focus on specific voting rules and we study the problem from a computational point
of view. In Section 4, we focus on the family of K-approval rules, including plurality and veto as specific
subcases, and give a full dichotomy result for the complexity of the possible winner problem with respect
to the addition of k new candidates; namely, we show that the problem is NP-complete as soon as K ≥ 3
and k ≥ 3, and polynomial if K ≤ 2 or k ≤ 2. In Section 5 we focus on the Borda rule and show that
the problem is polynomial-time solvable regardless of the number of new candidates. We also exhibit a more
general family of voting rules, including Borda, for which this result can be generalized. In Section 6 we
show that the problem can be hard for some positional scoring rules even if only one new candidate is added.
In Section 7 we discuss the relationship to the general possible winner problem, to the control of an election
by the chair via adding candidates, and to candidate cloning. Section 8 summarizes the results and mentions
further research directions.
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2 Background and notation
Let C be a finite set of candidates, and N a finite set of voters. The number of voters is denoted by n, and
the (total) number of candidates by m. A C-vote (called simply a vote when this is not ambiguous) is a linear
order over C, denoted by ≻ or by V . We sometimes denote votes in the following way: a ≻ b ≻ c is denoted
by abc, etc. An n-voterC-profile is a collection P = 〈V1, . . . , Vn〉 of C-votes. Let PC be the set of all C-votes
and therefore PnC be the set of all n-voter C-profiles. We denote by P∗C the set of all n-voter C-profiles for
n ≥ 1, i.e., P∗C = ∪n≥1PnC .
A voting rule on C is a function r from P∗C to C. A voting correspondence is a function from P∗C to
2C \ {∅}. The most natural way of obtaining a voting rule from a voting correspondence is to break ties
according to a fixed priority order on candidates. In this paper, we do not fix a priority order on candidates
(one reason being that the complete set of candidates is not known to start with), which means that we consider
voting correspondences rather than rules, and ask whether x is a possible cowinner for a given profile P . This
is equivalent to asking whether there exists a priority order for which x is a possible winner, or else whether
x is a possible winner for the most favorable priority order (with x having priority over all other candidates).
This is justified in our context by the fact that specifying such a priority order is problematic when we don’t
know in advance the identities of the potential new candidates. With a slight abuse of notation we denote voting
correspondences by r just as voting rules. Let r(P ) be the set of cowinners for profile P .
For P ∈ P∗C and x, x′ ∈ C, let n(P, i, x) be the number of votes in P ranking x in position i, ntop(P, x) =
n(P, 1, x) the number of votes in P ranking x first, and NP (x, x′) the number of votes in P ranking x above
x′. Let ~s = 〈s1, . . . , sm〉 be a vector of integers such that s1 ≥ . . . ≥ sm and s1 > sm. The scoring rule r~s(P )
induced by ~s elects the candidate(s) maximizing S~s(x, P ) =
∑m
i=1 si · n(P, i, x).
If K is a fixed integer then K-approval, rK , is the scoring rule corresponding to the vector ~sK =
〈1, . . . , 1, 0, . . . , 0〉 – with K 1’s and m−K 0’s. The K-approval score S ~sK (x, P ) of a candidate x is denoted
more simply by SK(x, P ): in other words, SK(x, P ) is the number of voters in P who rank x in the first
K positions, i.e., SK(x, P ) =
∑
i=1,...,K n(P, i, x). When K = 1, we get the plurality rule rP , and when
K = m− 1 we get the veto (or antiplurality) rule. The Borda rule rB is the scoring rule corresponding to the
vector 〈m− 1,m− 2, . . . , 0〉.
We now define formally situations where new candidates are added.
Definition 1 A voting situation with a varying set of candidates is a 4-tuple Σ = 〈N,X, PX , k〉 where N is
a set of voters (with |N | = n), X a set of candidates, PX = 〈V1, . . . , Vn〉 an n-voter X-profile, and k is a
positive integer, encoded in unary.
X denotes the set of initial candidates, PX the initial profile, and k the number of new candidates. Nothing
is known a priori about the voters’ preferences over the new candidates, henceforth their identity is irrelevant
and only their number counts. The assumption that k is encoded in unary ensures that the number of new
candidates is polynomial in the size of the input. Most of our results would still hold if the number of new
candidates is exponentially large in the size of the input, but for the sake of simplicity, and also because, in
practice, k will be small anyway, we prefer to exclude this possibility.
Because the number of candidates is not the same before and after the new candidates come in, we have
to consider families of voting rules (for a varying number of candidates) rather than voting rules for a fixed
number of candidates. While it is true that for many usual voting rules there is an obvious way of defining them
for a varying number of candidates, this is not the case for all of them, especially scoring rules. Still, some
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natural scoring rules, including plurality, veto, more generally K-approval, as well as Borda, are naturally
defined for any number of candidates. We shall therefore consider families of voting rules, parameterized by
the number of candidates (rm). We slightly abuse notation and denote these families of voting rules by r, and
consequently often write r(P ) instead of rm(P ). The complexity results we give in this paper make use of
such families of voting rules, where the number of candidates is variable.
If P is a C-profile and C′ ⊆ C, then the projection of P on C′, denoted by P ↓C′ , is obtained by delet-
ing all candidates in C \ C′ in each of the votes of P , and leaving unchanged the ranking on the candidates
of C′. For instance, if P = 〈abcd, dcab〉, then P ↓{a,b} = 〈ab, ab〉 and P ↓{a,b,c} = 〈abc, cab〉. In all sit-
uations, the set of initial candidates is denoted by X = {x1, . . . , xp} ∪ {x∗}, the set of the k new candi-
dates is denoted by Y = {y1, . . . , yk}. If PX is an X-profile and P ′ an X ∪ Y -profile, then we say that
P ′ extends PX if the projection of P ′ on X is exactly PX . For instance, let X = {x1, x2, x3} ∪ {x∗},
Y = {y1, y2}; the profile P ′ = 〈x1y1x∗x2y2x3, y1y2x1x2x3x∗, x3x2y2x∗y1x1〉 extends the X-profile PX =
〈x1x∗x2x3, x1x2x3x∗, x3x2x∗x1〉.
3 Possible winners when new candidates are added
We recall from [22] that given a collection 〈P1, . . . , Pn〉 of partial strict orders on C representing some incom-
plete information about the votes, a candidate x∗ is a possible winner if there is a profile 〈T1, . . . , Tn〉 where
each Ti is a ranking on C extending Pi in which x∗ wins. Reformulated for the case where Pi is a ranking of
the initial candidates (those in X), we get the following definition:
Definition 2 Given a voting situation Σ = 〈N,X, PX , k〉, and a collection r of voting rules, we say that
x∗ ∈ X is a possible cowinner with respect to Σ and r if there is a (X ∪ Y )-profile P ′ extending PX such that
x∗ ∈ r(P ′), where Y = {y1, . . . , yk} is a set of k new candidates.
Note that we do not have Y in the input, because it would be redundant with k: it is enough to know the
number of new candidates. Note also that all new candidates {y1, . . . , yk} have to appear in the extended votes
composing P ′.
Also, we do not consider the problem of deciding whether a new candidate yj is a possible cowinner,
because it is trivial. Indeed, as soon as the voting correspondence satisfies the extremely weak property that
a candidate ranked first by all voters is always a cowinner (which is obviously satisfied by all common voting
rules), any new candidate is a possible cowinner.
We now define formally the problems we study in this paper.
Definition 3 Given a collection r of voting rules, the POSSIBLE COWINNER PROBLEM WITH NEW CANDI-
DATES (or PCWNC) for r is defined as follows:
Input A voting situation Σ = 〈N,X, P, k〉 and a candidate x∗ ∈ X .
Question Is x∗ a possible cowinner with respect to Σ and r?
Also, the subproblem of PCWNC where the number k of new candidates is fixed will be denoted by PCWNC(k).
We can also define the notion of necessary cowinner with respect to Σ and r: x∗ ∈ X is a necessary
cowinner with respect to Σ, Y , and r if for every (X ∪ Y )-profile P ′ extending PX we have x∗ ∈ r(P ).
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However, the study of necessary cowinners in this particular setting will almost never lead to any significant
results. There may be necessary cowinners among the initial candidates, but this will happen rarely (and this
case will be discussed for a few specific voting rules in the corresponding parts of the paper).
Now we are in position to consider specific voting rules.
4 K-approval
As a warm-up we start by considering the plurality rule.
4.1 Plurality
Let us start with an example: supposeX = {a, b, c}, n = 13, and the plurality scores in PX are a 7→ 6, b 7→ 4,
c 7→ 3. There is only one new candidate (y). We have:
1. a is a possible cowinner (a will win in particular if the top candidate of every voter remains the same);
2. b is a possible cowinner: to see this, suppose that 2 voters who had ranked a first now rank y first; the
new scores are a 7→ 4, b 7→ 4, c 7→ 3, y 7→ 2;
3. c is not a possible cowinner: to reduce the scores of a (resp. b) to that of c, we need at least 3 (resp. 1)
voters who had ranked a (resp. b) first to now rank y first; but this then means that y gets at least 4 votes,
while c has only 3.
More generally, we have the following result:
Proposition 1 Let PX be an n-voter profile on X , and x∗ ∈ X . The candidate x∗ is a possible cowinner for
PX and plurality with respect to the addition of k new candidates if and only if
ntop(PX , x
∗) ≥
1
k
·
∑
xi∈X
max(0, ntop(PX , xi)− ntop(PX , x
∗))
Proof: Suppose first that the inequality holds. We build the following (X ∪ Y )-profile P ′ extending PX :
1. for every candidatexi such thatntop(PX , xi) > ntop(PX , x∗) we simply take ntop(PX , xi)−ntop(PX , x∗)
arbitrary votes ranking xi on top and place one of the yj’s on top of the vote (and the other yj’s any-
where), subject to the condition that no yj is placed on top of a vote more than ntop(PX , x∗) times.
(This is possible because the inequality is satisfied).
2. in all other votes (those not considered at step 1), place all yj’s anywhere except on top.
We obtain a profile P ′ extending PX . First, we have ntop(P ′, x∗) = ntop(PX , x∗), because in all the votes in
PX where x∗ is on top, the new top candidate in the corresponding vote in P ′ is still x∗ (cf. step 2), and all the
votes in PX where x∗ was not on top obviously cannot have x∗ on top in the corresponding vote in P ′. Sec-
ond, let xi 6= x∗. If ntop(PX , xi) ≤ ntop(PX , x∗) then ntop(P ′, xi) = ntop(PX , xi); and if ntop(PX , xi) >
ntop(PX , x
∗) then we have ntop(P ′, xi) = ntop(PX , xi)−(ntop(PX , xi)−ntop(PX , x∗)) = ntop(PX , x∗).
Therefore, x∗ is a cowinner for plurality in P ′.
Conversely, if the inequality is not satisfied, in order for x∗ to become a cowinner in P ′, the other xi’s
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must lose globally an amount of
∑
xi∈X
max(0, ntop(PX , xi) − ntop(PX , x∗)) votes. But since we have∑
xi∈X
max(0, ntop(PX , xi) − ntop(PX , x
∗)) > k · ntop(PX , x
∗), for at least one of the yj’s it must hold
that ntop(P ′, yj) > ntop(P ′, x∗); therefore x∗ cannot be a cowinner for plurality in P ′. 
We do not need to pay much attention to the veto rule, since the characterization of possible cowinners is
trivial. Indeed, by placing any of the new candidates below x∗ in every vote of PX where x∗ is ranked at the
bottom position, we obtain a vote P ′ where no one vetoes x∗, so any candidate is a possible cowinner.
As a corollary, computing possible cowinners for the rules of plurality (and veto) with respect to candidate
addition can be computed in polynomial time (which we already knew, since possible cowinners for plurality
and veto can be computed in polynomial time [5]).
4.2 K-approval, one new candidate
We start with the case where a single candidate is added. Recall that we denote by SK(xj , PX) the score of
xj for PX and K-approval (i.e. the number of voters who rank xj among their top K candidates); and by
n(PX ,K, xj) the number of voters who rank xj exactly in position K .
Proposition 2 Let K be an positive integer, PX be an n-voter profile on X , and x∗ ∈ X . The candidate x∗
is a possible cowinner for PX and K-approval with respect to the addition of one new candidate if and only if
the following two conditions hold:
1. for every xi 6= x∗, if SK(xi, PX) > SK(x∗, PX)
then n(PX ,K, xi) ≥ SK(xi, PX)− SK(x∗, PX).
2. SK(x∗, PX) ≥
∑
xi∈X
max(0, SK(xi, PX)− SK(x
∗, PX))
Proof: Assume conditions (1) and (2) are satisfied. Then, we build the following (X ∪ {y})-profile extending
PX :
(i) for every xi such that SK(xi, PX) > SK(x∗, PX), we take SK(xi, PX) − SK(x∗, PX) arbitrary votes
who rank xi in position K in PX and place y on top (condition (1) ensures that we can find enough such
votes).
(ii) in all other votes (those not considered at step (i)), place y in the bottom position.
We obtain a profile P ′ extending PX . First, we have SK(x∗, P ′) = SK(x∗, PX), because (a) all votes
in PX ranking x∗ in position K are extended in such a way that y is placed in the bottom position, therefore
x∗ gets a point in each of these votes if and only if it got a point in PX , and (b) in all the other votes (those
where x∗ is not ranked in position K in PX ), x∗ certainly gets a point in P ′ if and only if they got a point
in PX . This holds both in the case where y was added at the top or the bottom of the vote. Second, for
every xi such that SK(xi, PX) > SK(x∗, PX), xi loses exactly SK(xi, PX) − SK(x∗, PX) points when
PX is extended into P ′, therefore SK(xi, P ′) = SK(xi, PX) − SK(xi, PX) + SK(x∗, PX) = SK(x∗, PX).
Third, SK(y, P ′) =
∑
xi∈X
max(0, SK(xi, PX) − SK(x∗, PX)) ≤ SK(x∗, PX)—because of (2)—hence
SK(y, P
′) ≤ SK(x∗, P ′). Therefore, x∗ is a cowinner for K-approval in P ′.
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Now, assume condition (1) is not satisfied, that is, there is an xi such that SK(xi, PX) > SK(x∗, PX)
and such that n(PX ,K, xi) < SK(xi, PX) − SK(x∗, PX). There is no way of having xi lose more than
SK(xi, PX) points, therefore x∗ will never catch up with xi’s advantage and is therefore not a possible cowin-
ner. Finally, assume condition (2) is not satisfied, which means that we have ∑xi∈X max(0, SK(xi, PX) −
SK(x
∗, PX)) > SK(x
∗, PX). Then, in order for x∗ to reach the score of xi’s we must add y in one of the top
K positions in a number of votes exceeding SK(x∗, PX), therefore SK(y, P ′) > SK(x∗, PX) ≥ SK(x∗, P ′),
and therefore x∗ is not a possible cowinner. 
Therefore, computing possible cowinners for K-approval with respect to the addition of one candidate can
be done in polynomial time.
4.3 2-approval, any (fixed) number of new candidates
For each profile P and each candidate x′, we simply write s(x′, P ) for the score of x′ in P under r2, that is,
s(x′, P ) = S2(x
′, P ), i.e. the number of times that x′ is ranked within the top two positions in P .
Let PX = 〈V1, . . . , Vn〉 be an initial profile and Y = {y1, . . . , yk} the set of new candidates. Let x∗ ∈ X .
We want to know whether x∗ is a possible cowinner for 2-approval and PX . Let us partition PX into P1, P2
and P3, where P1 consists of the votes in which x∗ is ranked in the top position, P2 consists of the votes in
which x∗ is ranked in the second position and P3 consists of the votes in which x∗ is not ranked within the top
two positions. Let P be an extension of PX to X ∪ Y . For each candidate x′ ∈ X , we define the following
three subsets of P :
• HP(P, x′) is the set of votes in P where x′ is ranked in the second position and neither x∗ nor any new
candidate is ranked in the top position (HP stands for “high priority”).
• MP(P, x′) is the set of votes in P where x∗ or any new candidate is ranked in the top position and x′ is
ranked in the second position (MP stands for “medium priority”).
• LP(P, x′) is the set of votes in P where x′ is ranked in the top position and some x′′ ∈ X \ {x∗} is
ranked in the second position (LP stands for “low priority”).
These definitions also apply to PX ; our definitions then simplify into: HP(PX , x′) is the set of votes in PX
where x′ is ranked second and x∗ is not ranked first; MP(PX , x′) is the set of votes in PX where x∗ is
ranked first and x′ is ranked second; LP(PX , x′) is the set of votes in PX where x′ is ranked first and x∗ is
not ranked second. These definitions are summarized in Figure 1. Finally, for x ∈ X ∪ Y , let ∆(P, x) =
S2(x, P )− S2(x
∗, P ).
Let us compute these sets on a concrete example, which will be reused throughout the section.
Example 1 Let X = {x∗, x1, . . . , x6} and consider the following profile PX consisting of 19 votes (we only
mention the first two candidates in each vote):
v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 v6 v7 v8 v9 v10 v11 v12 v13 v14 v15 v16 v17 v18 v19
x∗ x1 x2 x3 x1 x1 x1 x2 x2 x2 x2 x2 x3 x3 x3 x3 x3 x3 x4
x1 x
∗ x∗ x∗ x4 x4 x5 x1 x3 x4 x5 x5 x1 x2 x4 x4 x5 x6 x6
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
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top candidate belongs to 2nd candidate belongs to
HP(P, x′) X\{x∗} {x′}
MP(P, x′) Y ∪ {x∗} {x′}
LP(P, x′) {x′} X\{x∗}
Figure 1: A vote V ∈ P belongs respectively to the sets HP(.),MP(.),LP(.) if its top two candidates belong
to the respective sets.
We have P1 = {v1}, P2 = {v2, v3, v4} and P3 = {v5, . . . , v19}. This is summarized together with the
priority classification in the following table:
HP MP LP ∆(PX , xi)
x1 v8, v13 v1 v5, v6, v7 3
x2 v14 v8, v9, v10, v11, v12 3
x3 v9 v13, v14, v15, v16, v17, v18 4
x4 v5, v6, v10, v15, v16 v19 2
x5 v7, v11, v12, v17 0
x6 v18, v19 −2
If P ∗ is an extension of PX to X ∪Y then we write P ∗ = 〈V ∗1 , . . . , V ∗n 〉, where V ∗i is the vote overX ∪Y
extending Vi. We now establish a useful property of the extensions of PX for which x∗ is a cowinner. Without
loss of generality, we assume that in every vote V ∗i , every new candidate yj is ranked either in the first two
positions, or below all candidates of X .
Proposition 3 If there exists an extension P of PX such that x∗ ∈ r2(P ), then there exists an extension P ∗ of
PX such that x∗ ∈ r2(P ∗), and satisfying the following conditions:
1. For each Vi ∈ PX , if x∗ is ranked within the top two positions in Vi, then x∗ is also ranked within the
top two positions in V ∗i .
2. For each V ∗i ∈ P ∗, if the top candidate of V ∗i is not in Y then the second-ranked candidate of V ∗i is not
in Y either.
3. For each x′ ∈ X \ {x∗} and each Vi ∈ MP(PX , x′) ∪ LP(PX , x′), if x′ is not ranked within the top two
positions in V ∗i , then for each Vj ∈ HP(PX , x′), x′ is not ranked within the top two positions in V ∗j .
Proof: We consider in turn the different conditions:
1. This is because if there exists V ′ ∈ P such that x∗ is not in the top two positions whereas x∗ is in the
top two positions in its original vote V ∈ PX , then we can simply move all of candidates in Y ranked
higher than x∗ to the bottom positions. Let V ∗ denote the vote obtained this way. By replacing V ′ with
V ∗, we increase the score of x∗ by 1, and the score of each other candidate by no more than 1, which
means that x∗ is still a cowinner.
2. If there exists V ′ ∈ P such that x′ ∈ X is ranked in the top position and y ∈ Y is ranked in the second
position, then we simply obtain V ∗ by switching y and x′.
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3. The condition states that for each candidate x′, whenever we want to reduce its score, we should first try
to reduce it by putting a new candidate y ∈ Y on top of some vote in V ∈ HP(PX , x′). This is because
by putting y on top of some vote in HP(PX , x′), we may use only one extra candidate y′ ∈ Y to reduce
by one unit the score of the candidate ranked at the top position of V . Formally, suppose there exist
V1 ∈ HP(PX , x′) and V2 ∈ MP(PX , x′) ∪ LP(PX , x′) such that x′ is within the top two positions of V ′1
(the extension of V1) but not within the top two positions of V ′2 (the extension of V2). Let y ∈ Y be any
candidate ranked within the top two positions of V ′2 . Let V ∗2 denote the vote obtained from V ′2 by moving
y to the bottom, and let V ∗1 denote the vote obtained from V ′1 by moving y to the top position. Next,
we replace V ′1 and V ′2 by V ∗1 and V ∗2 , respectively. It follows that the score of each candidate does not
change, which means that x∗ is still a cowinner. We repeat this procedure until statement (3) is satisfied
for every x′ ∈ X \ {x∗}. Since after each iteration there is at least one additional vote that will never be
modified again, this procedure ends in O(|PX |) times.

Proposition 3 simply tells us that when looking for an extension that makes x∗ a cowinner, it suffices to
restrict our attention to the extensions that satisfy conditions (1) to (3). Moreover, using (1) of Proposition 3,
we deduce that s(x∗, P ∗) = s(x∗, PX). Hence, for votes V ∈ P2 (the votes in which x∗ is ranked in the
second position), we can assume that the new candidates of Y are put in bottom positions in P ∗.
Define X• as the set of all candidates in X such that ∆(PX , xi) > 0. Our objective is to reduce all score
differences to 0 for x ∈ X•, while keeping the score differences of each new candidate non-positive. (We do
not have to care about the candidates in X \X•).
The intuition underlying our algorithm is that when trying to reduce ∆(P, xi) on the current profile P , we
first try to use the votes in HP(PX , xi), then the votes in MP(PX , xi), and finally the votes in LP(PX , xi). This
is because putting some candidates from Y in the top positions in the votes of HP(PX , xi) not only reduces
∆(P, xi) by one unit, but also creates an opportunity to “pay” one extra candidate from Y to reduce ∆(P, xj)
by one unit, where xj is the candidate ranked on top of this vote. For the votes in MP(PX , xi), we can only
reduce ∆(PX , xi) by one unit without any other benefit. For the votes in LP(PX , xi) we will have to use two
candidates from Y to bring down ∆(P, xi) by one unit; however, if we already put some y ∈ Y in the top
position in order to reduce ∆(P, xj), where xj is the candidate ranked in the second position in the original
vote, then we only need to pay one extra candidate in Y to reduce ∆(P, xi) by one unit. Therefore, the major
issue consists in finding the most efficient way to choose the votes in HP(PX , xi) to reduce ∆(P, xi), when
∆(P, xi) ≤ |HP(P, xi)|. We will solve this problem by reducing it to a max-flow problem.
The algorithm is composed of a main function CheckCowinner(.) which comes together with two sub-
functions AddNewAlternativeOnTop(.) and BuildMaxFlowGraph(.) that we detail first.
Algorithm 1: AddNewAlternativeOnTop(P, V, Y )
1 yi ← argminj {∆(P, yj) : yj ∈ Y } // take lowest index i when tie-breaking
2 add yi on top of V and update P
3 return P
The procedure AddNewAlternativeOnTop simply picks new candidates to be put on top of votes, and up-
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dates subsequently the profile. Note that in this procedure, candidates from Y to be added on top of the votes
are those with the lowest score (or the lowest index, in case of ties). This results in choosing new candidates in
a cyclic order y1 → y2 . . .→ y|Y | → y1 . . .
As for the function BuildMaxFlowGraph(P, x∗, X1, X2), it builds the weighted directed graph G =
〈W,E〉 defined as follows:
• W = {s, t} ∪X1 ∪X2 ∪
⋃
xi∈X2
LP(P, xi);
• E contains the following weighted edges:
– for each x ∈ X1, an edge (s, x) with weight ∆(P, x);
– for each x ∈ X2 and each V ∈ LP(P, x): an edge (V, x) with weight 1; plus, if the candidate x′ in
second position in V is in X1, an edge (x′, V ) with weight 1;
– for each x ∈ X2, an edge (x, t) with weight ∆(P, x).
We refer the reader to Figure 2 for an illustration. (Once this graph is constructed, any standard function to
compute a flow φ of maximal value can of course be used). We are now in a position to detail the main function
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CheckCowinner(.).
Algorithm 2: CheckCowinner(PX, x∗, Y )
1 P ← PX
2 T ← 0 // number of calls AddNewAlternativeOnTop
3 X1 ← {xi ∈ X• : |HP(PX , xi)| > ∆(PX , xi)}
4 X2 ← {xi ∈ X• : |HP(PX , xi)| ≤ ∆(PX , xi)}
5 REM ← ∅
6 for xi ∈ X2 do
7 for V ∈ HP(P, xi) do
8 P ← AddNewAlternativeOnTop(P, V, Y )
9 T++
10 for xi ∈ X2 do
11 for V ∈ MP(P, xi) do
12 if ∆(P, xi) > 0 then
13 P ← AddNewAlternativeOnTop(P, V, Y )
14 T++
15 else
16 REM ← REM ∪ {xi}
17 X2 ← X2\REM
18 if ∃y ∈ Y such that ∆(P, y) > 0 then
19 return false
20 G← BuildMaxFlowGraph(P, x∗, X1, X2)
21 φ← ComputeMaxFlow(G, s, t)
22 if F ≥
∑
i≤m−1∆(P, xi) +
∑
xi∈X2
∆(P, xi)− (|Y | · s(x∗, PX)− T ) then
23 return true
24 return false
Proposition 4 Given a profile PX on X , a candidate x∗ ∈ X and a set of new candidates Y , a call to
algorithm CheckCowinner(PX , x∗, Y ) returns in polynomial time the answer true if and only if there exists an
extension of PX in which x∗ is a cowinner.
Proof: Algorithm 2 starts by partitioningX• into X1 and X2: an alternative x ∈ X• is in X1 if |HP(PX , x)| >
∆(PX , xi) and in X2 if |HP(PX , x)| ≤ ∆(PX , x).
Let x ∈ X2. Then by item (3) of Proposition 3, for each vote in V ∈ HP(P, x), we can safely put one
candidate from Y in the top position of V ; this is done in the first phase of Algorithm 2, lines 6 to 9. Note that
after adding a new candidate on top of a vote V ∈ HP(P, x) and after updating P , the modified vote will no
longer belong to HP(P, x). Instead, it will now belong to MP(P, x′) for some other candidate x′.
When Phase 1 is over, the score of x ∈ X2 may still need to be lowered down, which can be done next by
using votes from MP(PX , x). This is what Phase 2 does, from line 10 to line 16. There are three possibilities:
1. |HP(PX , x)| = ∆(PX , x). In this case, the votes in HP(PX , x) are sufficient to make x∗ catch up x:
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after Phase 1, we have ∆(PX , x) = 0 and Phase 2 is void; we are done with x.
2. |HP(PX , x)| < ∆(PX , x) and |HP(PX , x)|+ |MP(PX , x)| ≥ ∆(PX , x): in this case, to make x∗ catch
up x, it is enough to take ∆(PX , x) − |HP(PX , x)| arbitrary votes in MP(PX , x) and add one new
candidate on top of them; this is what Phase 2 does, and after that we are done with x.
3. |HP(PX , x)| + |MP(PX , x)| < ∆(PX , x): in this case, because of Proposition 3, we know that it is
safe to add one new candidate on top of all votes of MP(PX , x); this is what Phase 2 does; after that,
we still need to lower down the score of x, which will require to add new candidates on top of votes of
LP(PX , x).
If at this point a newly added candidate has a score higher than x∗, then x∗ cannot win, and we can stop
the program (line 19).
For readability, let us denote by P˜ the profile obtained after Phases 1 and 2. For each x ∈ X2 satisfying
condition 3, the only way to reduce ∆(P˜ , x) is to put two candidates of Y within the top two positions in a
vote of LP(P˜ , x), because in Phases 1 and 2 we have used up all the votes in HP(P, x) and MP(P, x). Now,
reducing ∆(P˜ , x) by one unit will cost us two candidates in Y , but meanwhile, ∆(P˜ , x′) is also reduced by
one unit, where x′ is the candidate ranked in the second position in V . We must have x′ ∈ X1. We note that⋃
x∈X2
LP(PX , x) ⊆
⋃
x′∈X1
HP(PX , x′). Choosing optimally the votes in LP(PX , x) for each x ∈ X2 can
be done by solving an integral max-flow instance which is build by algorithm BuildMaxFlowGraph (note that
in case where either X1 or X2 is empty, we just assume that the flow has a null value).
Let us show that x∗ is a possible cowinner if and only if the value of the flow from s to t is at least∑
i≤m−1∆(P˜ , xi) +
∑
xi∈X2
∆(P˜ , xi) − (|Y | · s(x∗, PX) − T ). Observe that the flow does not necessarily
bring all ∆(P˜ , xi) to 0, therefore we sometimes need a postprocessing consisting of adding further new candi-
dates on top of some votes (see steps 2 and 3 below).
Suppose first that the above max-flow instance has a solution whose value which is at least
∑
i≤m−1
∆(P˜ , xi) +
∑
xi∈X2
∆(P˜ , xi)− (|Y | · s(x
∗, PX)− T )
We show how to solve our cowinner problem from the solution to this flow problem. Because the instance is
integral, there must exist an integral solution. We arbitrarily choose one integral solution φ (as returned by
ComputeMaxFlox), which assigns to each edge (xi, xj) an integer φ(xi, xj) which represents the value of the
flow on this edge. Here, we give a procedure which produces an extension P of PX where x∗ is a cowinner :
1. For each xi ∈ X2 and each V ∈ LP(P˜ , xi), if there is a flow from xi to xj via V , then we obtain V ∗
from V by putting two candidates from Y in the top positions (that is, both ∆(P˜ , xi) and ∆(P˜ , xj) are
reduced by 1, which comes at the cost of using candidates in Y twice). It is possible since |Y | ≥ 2.
2. For each xi ∈ X2, if φ(xi, t) < ∆(P˜ , xi), then we arbitrarily choose ∆(P˜ , xi) − φ(xi, t) votes V ∈
LP(P˜ , xi) among those which haven’t been selected in the previous step, and obtain V ∗ by putting two
candidates from Y in the top two positions (again, we will specify how to choose the two candidates
from Y later). It is possible since |Y | ≥ 2.
3. For each xj ∈ X1, if φ(s, xj) < ∆(P˜ , xi), then we arbitrarily choose ∆(P˜ , xi) − φ(s, xj) votes
V ∈ HP(P˜ , xj) such that V ∗ is not defined above (in (1) or (2)), and then we obtain V ∗ by putting
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exactly one candidate from Y in the top position of V . This is possible because, by construction,
|HP(P˜ , xj)| = |HP(P, xj)| ≥ ∆(P, xi) ≥ ∆(P˜ , xi) for xj ∈ X1.
4. For each V ∗, if a candidate y ∈ Y is not selected for one of the first two positions, then it is ranked at
the bottom position.
In the above procedure (similarly to what is done in Algorithm 1), priority is given to candidates from Y
with the lowest score (or the lowest index, in case of ties) when it comes to choose those to be added on top of
the votes.
Let us now determine the number of times that new candidates from Y are inserted on top of the votes.
Recall that until line 20 of the algorithm, we have used the candidates from Y exactly T times. Now consider
the four-step procedure described above. Observe that to reduce by one unit the score deficit with respect
to one candidate, steps 1 and 3 require one occurrence of a candidate of Y (step 1 uses two occurrences but
reduces the score deficit with respect to two candidates), while step 2 requires two occurrences. Thus, for each
i ≤ m− 1, we have to use ∆(P˜ , xi) times the candidates from Y , plus the additional occurrences required in
step 2. More precisely, step 2 requires, for each xi ∈ X2, ∆(P˜ , xi) − φ(xi, t) additional occurrences of new
candidates in the completed votes. Therefore, the total number of times that the candidates of Y are ranked
either in first or second position (denoted sY for readability), is such that:
sY ≤
∑
i≤m−1
∆(P˜ , xi) + (
∑
xi∈X2
∆(P˜ , xi)−
∑
xi∈X2
φ(xi, t)) (1)
=
∑
i≤m−1
∆(P˜ , xi) + (
∑
xi∈X2
∆(P˜ , xi)− φ) (2)
But we also have :
φ ≥
∑
i≤m−1
∆(P˜ , xi) +
∑
xi∈X2
∆(P˜ , xi)− (|Y | · s(x
∗, PX)− T ) (3)
By combining (2) and (3), we thus get :
sY ≤|Y | · s(x
∗, PX)− T
≤|Y | · s(x∗, PX)
That is, our algorithm will put candidates from Y in the top two positions in the extension no more than
|Y | · s(x∗, PX) times. Because the addition of new candidates is done in a cyclic order, each new candidate
will eventually appear at most s(x∗, PX) in the top two positions of the votes. Thus, the score of these new
candidates will not exceed that of x∗. It follows that x∗ is a cowinner in P ∗, since for all other candidates
xi ∈ X , we have ∆(P ∗, xi) ≤ 0.
Next, we show that if x∗ is a possible cowinner, then the value of a max-flow must be at least
∑
i≤m−1
∆(P˜ , xi) +
∑
xi∈X2
∆(P˜ , xi)− (|Y | · s(x
∗, PX)− T )
Due to Proposition 3, each extension profile P ∗ of PX where x∗ becomes a cowinner to the problem instance
can be converted to a profile P˜ as in the steps before line 20 in the algorithm. Now, for each xi ∈ X2, let
li denote the number of votes V ∈ LP(P˜ , xi) such that in its extension V ∗, the top two positions are the
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candidates of Y . We must have that li ≥ ∆(P˜ , xi). For every xi ∈ X2, we arbitrarily choose li −∆(P˜ , xi)
such votes, and move the first ranked candidate to the bottom position. For each xj ∈ X1, let lj denote the
number of votes V ∈ HP(P˜ , xj) ∪ MP(P˜ , xj) such that in its extension V ∗, a candidate from Y is ranked in
the top position. We must have that lj ≥ ∆(P˜ , xj). For every xj ∈ X1, we arbitrarily choose lj −∆(P˜ , xj)
such votes, and move the first ranked candidate to the bottom position.
Now, let there be a flow from xj ∈ X1 to xi ∈ X2 via V if V ∈ LP(P˜ , xi) and the top two positions in V ∗
are both in Y . This defines a flow whose value is at least
∑
xi∈X2
∆(P˜ , xi)−
∑
xj∈X1
(lj−∆(P˜ , xj)). Because
the score of each candidate of Y is no more than s(x∗, PX), we know that |Y | · s(x∗, PX)− T ≥
∑
i≤m−1 li.
Actually, |Y | · s(x∗, PX) is the maximum score that the whole set of new candidates of Y can reach in such
a way that x∗ is a cowinner. In the partial profile P˜ (line 20 of Algorithm CheckCowinner(PX , x∗, Y )), the
global score of Y is T . Finally, since
∑
i≤m−1 li + T corresponds to the global score that Y has in profile P ∗
(where x∗ becomes a cowinner), we get |Y | · s(x∗, PX) ≥
∑
i≤m−1 li + T .
Hence, |Y |·s(x∗, PX)−T ≥
∑
i≤m−1 li ≥
∑
xi∈X2
∆(P˜ , xi)+
∑
xj∈X1
lj , or equivalently,−
∑
xj∈X1
lj ≥∑
xi∈X2
∆(P˜ , xi)− (|Y | · s(x∗, PX)− T ). Hence, we get:
φ ≥
∑
xi∈X2
∆(P˜ , xi)−
∑
xj∈X1
(lj −∆(P˜ , xj))
=
∑
i≤m−1
∆(P˜ , xi)−
∑
xj∈X1
lj
≥
∑
i≤m−1
∆(P˜ , xi) +
∑
xi∈X2
∆(P˜ , xi)− (|Y |s(x
∗, PX)− T )
Thus, we have shown that x∗ is a possible cowinner if and only if the value of the flow from s to t is at least∑
i≤m−1∆(P˜ , xi) +
∑
xi∈X2
∆(P˜ , xi)− (|Y | · s(x∗, PX)− T ). This concludes the proof. 
Corollary 1 Deciding whether x∗ is a possible cowinner for 2-approval with respect to the addition of new
candidates is in P.
To better understand Algorithm 1, we will now run it step by step on the example introduced previously.
Example 2 Consider the profile described in Example 1. We assume the number of new candidates is k = 3.
First, the initial scores of the candidates are s(x∗, PX) = 4, s(x1, PX) = 7, s(x2, PX) = 7, s(x3, PX) = 8,
s(x4, PX) = 6 and s(x5, PX) = 4 and s(x6, PX) = 2. The candidates whose score exceeds that of x∗ are x1,
x2, x3 and x4, with the score differences ∆(P, x1) = 3, ∆(P, x2) = 3, ∆(P, x3) = 4 and ∆(P, x4) = 2. At
first phase, we check if there are candidates xi for which |HP (PX , xi)| ≤ ∆(PX , xi). This is the case for x1,
x2 and x3, thus we put one new candidate on top of v8, v9, v13 and v14. The updated table is as follows:
HP MP LP ∆(P, xi)
x1 v1 v5, v6, v7 1
x2 v
′
8, v
′
9 v10, v11, v12 2
x3 v
′
13, v
′
14 v15, v16, v17, v18 3
x4 v5, v6, v10, v15, v16 v19 2
Here, v′i refers to the vote vi to which new candidates have been added.
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At the second phase, X2 = {x1, x2, x3} and X1 = {x4} (we do not worry about x5 and x6 for which
nothing special has to be done). We put one new candidate on top of v1, v′8, v′9, v′13 and v′14, and we are done
with x1 and x2 (since ∆(P, x1) = 0 and ∆(P, x2) = 0). The profile is now P˜ and the updated table is :
HP MP LP ∆(P˜ , xi)
x3 v15, v16, v17, v18 1
x4 v5, v6, v10, v15, v16 v19 2
So far we have used the new candidates 9 times, and s(x∗, P˜ ) = 4, therefore if we have less than three new
candidates we stop (x∗ is not a possible cowinner) otherwise we continue. Now the situation is as follows and
we have to solve the corresponding maxflow problem (we omit the value of edges when it equals 1).
v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 v6 v7 v8 v9 v10 v11 v12 v13 v14 v15 v16 v17 v18 v19
• x1 x2 x3 x1 x1 x1 • • x2 x2 x2 • • x3 x3 x3 x3 x4
x∗ x∗ x∗ x∗ x4 x4 x5 • • x4 x5 x5 • • x4 x4 x5 x6 x6
.
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Figure 2: The flow graph returned by BuildMaxFlowGraph(P˜ , x∗, {x4}, {x3}).
The maximum flow has value 1 and is obtained for instance by having a flow 1 for instance through the
edges s → x4, x4 → v16, v16 → x3, x3 → t (going through v15 is an equally good option). Therefore we
place two new candidates on top of v16, which has the effect of making the score of x3 and x4 decrease by
one unit each. We still have to make the score of x4 decrease by one unit, and for this we must place one new
candidates on top of any of the votes v5, v6, v10, v15 (say v5). In total we will have used the new candidates 12
times, therefore, c is a possible cowinner if and only if the number of new candidates is at least 3. A possible
extension (with 3 new candidates) is as follows:
v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 v6 v7 v8 v9 v10 v11 v12 v13 v14 v15 v16 v17 v18 v19
y1 x1 x2 x3 y2 x1 x1 y1 y2 x2 x2 x2 y1 y2 x3 y1 x3 x3 x4
x∗ x∗ x∗ x∗ x1 x4 x5 y3 y3 x4 x5 x5 y3 y3 x4 y2 x5 x6 x6
.
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4.4 K-approval, two new candidates
Let X = {x∗} ∪ {x1, . . . , xp} be the set of (initial) candidates, x∗ being the candidate that we want to make a
cowinner, Y = {y1, y2} the two new candidates, and PX = 〈V1, . . . , Vn〉 the initial profile, where each Vi is a
sequence of K candidates in X . We first introduce the following notation:
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• For each x ∈ X , UPX (x) is the number of votes in PX whose candidates ranked K − 1 and K are
respectively x and x∗, and TPX (x) = SK−2(x, PX) + UPX (x). (Recall that SK−2(x, PX) is the
number of voters in PX who rank x in the first K − 2 positions.)
We establish the following lemma.
Lemma 1 For each x ∈ X , there exists a completionQ ofPX by adding two candidates such that SK(x,Q) ≤
SK(x
∗, Q) if and only if TPX (x) ≤ SK(x∗, PX).
Proof: Assume TPX (x) > SK(x∗, PX), and let Q be a completion of PX by adding two candidates in which
x∗ is a cowinner. Let us partitionPX into P1, P2 and P3, as follows: every vote in P1 is such that the candidates
ranked K− 1 and K are respectively x and x∗; P2 contains all votes ranking x in the first K− 2 positions; and
P3 contains all other votes in PX . Let Q1, Q2 and Q3 be the corresponding votes in Q, and let α be the number
of votes in Q1 where the two new candidates have been placed in the first K positions, thus eliminating
both x and x∗ from the K first positions; clearly, we have SK(x,Q1) = SK(x, P1) − α = UPX (x) − α
and SK(x∗, Q1) ≤ SK(x∗, P1) − α (the inequality can be strict, in case there are some votes in Q1 where
only one new candidate was placed in the first K positions). Now, regardless of the position of the two new
candidates, we haveSK(x,Q2) = SK−2(x, P2). We get SK(x,Q) = SK(x,Q1)+SK(x,Q2)+SK(x,Q3) ≥
UPX (x)−α+ SK−2(x, P2) = TPX (x)−α, whereas SK(x∗, Q) ≤ SK(x∗, PX)−α. The initial assumption
TPX (x) > SK(x
∗, PX) implies TPX (x) − α > SK(x∗, PX)− α, therefore SK(x,Q) > SK(x∗, Q).
Conversely, assume TPX (x) ≤ SK(x∗, PX), and let us build Q as follows: we introduce one new candi-
date on top of each vote of PX that ranks x in position K , and two new candidates on top of each vote of PX
that ranks x in position K − 1 and x′ 6= x∗ in position K . It is easy to check that SK(x∗, Q) = SK(x∗, PX).
Now, the only votes of Q where x remains among the first K position are those of Q1 and of Q2, therefore
SK(x,Q) = T
PX (x) ≤ SK(x∗, PX) = SK(x∗, Q). 
Proposition 5 Deciding whether x∗ is a possible cowinner for K-approval with respect to the addition of 2
new candidates is in P.
Proof: A consequence of Lemma 1 is that if TPX (x) > SK(x∗, PX) for some x, then x∗ cannot be a pos-
sible cowinner in PX under 2-approval with 2 new candidates; and obviously, checking whether TPX (x) >
SK(x
∗, PX) holds for some x can be done in polynomial time. Therefore, from now on, we assume that
TPX (x) ≤ SK(x∗, PX) holds for every x ∈ X — assuming this will not change the complexity of the prob-
lem.
We now give a polynomial reduction from the possible cowinner problem for K-approval and 2 new can-
didates to the possible cowinner problem for 2-approval and 2 new candidates, which we already know to be
polynomial. Let 〈N,X, PX , 2〉 be an instance of the possible cowinner problem forK-approval with respect to
the addition of 2 new candidates. We build an instance 〈N ′, X ′, RX′ , 2〉 of the possible cowinner problem for
2-approval with respect to the addition of 2 new candidates in the following way. The profile PX is translated
into the following profile R = RX′ :
• the set of candidates isX ′ = X∪{zj, 1 ≤ j ≤
∑
x∈X\{x∗} SK−2(x, PX)}∪{z
′
j, 1 ≤ j ≤ SK−2(x
∗, PX)},
where all zj and z′j are fresh candidates;
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• for every vote Vi in PX , we have in R a vote Wi including the candidates ranked in positions K − 1 and
K of Vi, and then the remaining candidates in any order. We denote by R1 be the resulting set of votes;
• for every x ∈ X \ {x∗}, we have SK−2(x, PX) votes xzj , and then the remaining candidates in any
order. We denote by R2 the resulting set of votes;
• similarly, we have SK−2(x∗, PX) votes z′jx∗, and then the remaining candidates in any order. We denote
by R3 the resulting set of votes.
We note that if x ∈ X then SK(x, PX) = S2(x,R), and for every fresh candidate z, S2(z,R) = 1.
Without loss of generality we assume SK(x∗, PX) ≥ 1 (otherwise we know for sure that x∗ cannot be a
possible cowinner).
We decompose the rest of the proof into two lemmas.
Lemma 2 If x∗ is a possible cowinner for K-approval with 2 new candidates in PX , then it is is a possible
cowinner for 2-approval with 2 new candidates in R.
Proof: Suppose that x∗ is a possible cowinner for K-approval with 2 new candidates Y = {y1, y2} in PX and
let P ′ = 〈V ′1 , . . . , V ′n〉 be an extension of PX with two new candidates where x∗ is a cowinner. Let us use
these two new candidates in the same way in R: every time a new candidate is used for being placed on top
of Vi, it is also used for being placed on top of Wi. Let R′ be the resulting profile. All candidates in X have
the same scores in PX and in R, they also will have the same scores in P ′ and R′; as for the fresh candidates
zj , z
′
j , S2(zj , R
′) = S2(z
′
j , R
′) = 1 ≤ S2(x∗, R′); therefore, x∗ is a cowinner in R′ and a possible cowinner
for 2-approval with 2 new candidates in R. 
Lemma 3 If x∗ is a possible cowinner for K-approval with 2 new candidates in R , then it is a possible
cowinner for 2-approval in PX .
Proof: Suppose that x∗ is a possible cowinner for 2-approval with 2 new candidates Y = {y1, y2} in R, and
let R′ be a completion of R where x∗ is a cowinner for 2-approval. Let us write R′ = R′1 ∪ R′2 ∪ R′3, where
R′1 (resp. R′2, R′3) consists in the completions of the votes in R1 (resp. R2, R3). By a slight abuse of language
we denote by R1, R′1 etc. only the part of the votes in R1, R′1 etc. consisting of the top two candidates only.
We first claim that we can assume without loss of generality that R′2 = R2 and R′3 = R3 that is, the only
votes in R′ where some new candidates have been placed on one of the top two positions are in R′1. Suppose
this is not the case; then we are in one of the following four situations: (1) there is a vote in R′2 of the form yjxi,
where yj ∈ Y and xi ∈ X , or (2) there is a vote in R′2 of the form y1y2 or y2y1, or (3) there is a vote in R′3 of
the form yiz′j or (4) there is a vote in R′3 of the form y1y2 or y2y1. Consider first cases (1), (3) and (4). Take
one of these votes in R′2 (case (1)) or in R′3 (cases (3) or (4)) and replace it by the original vote xzj in R2 (case
1) or in z′jx∗ in R′3 (cases (3) or (4)). Let R′′ be the profile obtained. We have S2(x∗, R′′) ≥ S2(x∗, R′) ≥ 1,
for every xi ∈ X , S2(xi, R′′) = S2(xi, R′), for every zj , S2(zj , R′′) ≤ 1, and for every z′j , S2(z′j , R′′) ≤ 1.
Therefore, when transforming R′ into R′′, the score of x∗ does not decrease whereas the score of all other
candidates does not increase; because x∗ is a cowinner in R′, it is still a cowinner in R′′. Lastly, R′′ is also an
extension of R.
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By induction, if we perform this operation for each occurrence of cases (1), (3) or (4), we end up with a
profile R′′, which is an extension of R for which situations (1), (3) and (4) do not occur, and such that x∗ is a
cowinner for 2-approval in R′′. Let R′′ = R′′1 ∪R′′2 ∪R′′3 = R′′1 ∪R′′2 ∪R3.
Now, consider case (2). Let xizj be one of the votes in R2 corresponding to a vote y1y2 (or y2y1) in R′′2 .
Apply the following procedure in this order:
1. Assume that xi does not appear in R′′1 except in votes of the form xix∗, and let R′′′ be the profile
obtained from R′′ by replacing the vote y1y2 in R′′2 by the original vote xizj in R2. Then S2(xi, R′′′) =
S2(xi, R
′′′
1 ) + S2(xi, R
′′′
2 ) ≤ S2(xi, R
′′′
1 ) + S2(xi, R2). Now, S2(xi, R′′′) ≤ S2(xi, R′′′) = UPX (xi)
and S2(xi, R2) = SK−2(xi, PX), therefore S2(xi, R′′′) ≤ UPX (xi) + SK−2(xi, PX) = TPX (xi) ≤
SK(x
∗, PX) = S2(x
∗, R) = S2(x
∗, R′′′). Therefore, x∗ is also a cowinner in R′′′.
2. Now, assume that xi appears in at least one vote of R′′1 of the form x∗xi, xixj or xjxi. If this is a vote of
the form xixj , we replace y1y2 in R′′2 by the original vote xizj in R2 and the vote xixj by a vote y1y2.
If this is a vote of the form x∗xi or xjxi, we replace y1y2 in R′′2 by the original vote xizj in R2 and the
vote x∗xi (resp. xjxi) by y1x∗ (resp. y1xj ). In all three cases, the score of all candidates remain the
same after the transformation, except the score of y2 and zj , which can only decrease, therefore x∗ is
still a cowinner after the transformation.
We perform this procedure on xi iteratively until all the votes y1y2 (or y2y1) in R′′′2 have been replaced by
the original votes xizj in R2. After doing this sequentially on all candidates of X such that case (2) occurs, we
end up with a profile R′′′′ of P such that R′′′′2 = R2 and R′′′′3 = R3 and x∗ is a cowinner in R′′′′. This proves
the claim.
Now, let R′ be a completion of R where x∗ is a cowinner for 2-approval, where R′2 = R2 and R′3 = R3.
From R′ we build the following extension P ′ of P : for every vote Wi ∈ R1,
• if W ′i is of the form x∗x′ then V ′i = W ′i ;
• if W ′i is of the form yix then V ′i is obtained from Vi by placing yi on top;
• if W ′i is of the form y1y2 (or y2y1) then V ′i is obtained from Vi by placing {y1, y2} on top.
The scores of all candidates are the same in P ′ and in R′, therefore x∗ is a cowinner in P ′ if only if it is a
cowinner in R′. Therefore, it is a cowinner in P ′, which means that x∗ is a possible cowinner for 2-approval
in P . 
We can now end the proof of Proposition 5: from Lemmas 2 and 3 we conclude that deciding whether x∗ is
a possible cowinner forK-approval with respect to the addition of two candidates can be polynomially reduced
to a problem of a deciding whether x∗ is a possible cowinner for 2-approval, which we know is in P. 
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4.5 3-approval, 3 new candidates
We will now see that the problems addressed in previous subsections constitute the frontier of what can be
solved in polynomial-time forK-approval rules. In the rest of this paper, the hardness proofs will use reductions
from the 3-dimensional matching (3-DM) problem.
Definition 4 An instance of 3-DM consists of a subset C = {e1, . . . , em} ⊆ A × B × C of triples, where
A,B,C are 3 pairwise disjoint sets of size n′ with A = {a1, . . . , an′}, B = {b1, . . . , bn′} and C =
{c1, . . . , cn′}. For z ∈ A ∪ B ∪ C, d(z) denotes the number of occurrences of z in C, that is the number
of triples of C which contain z. A matching is a subset M ⊆ C such that no two elements in M agree on any
coordinate. The 3-DM problem consists in answering this question: does there exist a perfect matching M on
C, that is, a matching of size n′?
The 3-DM problem is known to be NP-complete (problem [SP1] page 221 in [19]), even with the restric-
tion where ∀z ∈ A ∪ B ∪ C, d(z) ∈ {2, 3} (that is, no element of A ∪ B ∪ C occurs in more than 3 triples,
and each element of A ∪B ∪ C appears in at least 2 triples).
Proposition 6 Deciding if x∗ is a possible cowinner for 3-approval with respect to the addition of 3 new
candidates, is an NP-complete problem.
Proof: This problem is clearly in NP. The hardness proof is based on a reduction from 3-DM (see Definition
4).
Let I = (C, A × B × C) be an instance of 3-DM with n′ ≥ 3 and ∀z ∈ A ∪ B ∪ C, d(z) ∈ {2, 3}.
From I , we build an instance of the PcWNC problem as follows. The set X of candidates contains x∗, X1 =
{x′i, y
′
i, z
′
i : 1 ≤ i ≤ n
′} where x′i, y′i, z′i correspond to elements of A ∪ B ∪ C and a set X2 of dummy
candidates. We now describe the votes informally; their formal definition will follow. The set N of voters
contains N1 = {ve : e ∈ C} and a set N2 of dummy voters. For each voter, we only indicate her first three
candidates. Thus, the vote of ve is (x′i, y′j , z′k) where e = (ai, bj , ck) ∈ C. The preference of dummy voters
are such that :
(i) the scores of the candidates in X satisfy ∀x ∈ X1, S3(x, PX) = n′+1, S3(x∗, PX) = n′ and ∀x ∈ X2,
S3(x, PX) = 1;
(ii) the vote of any voter of N2 contains at most one candidate from {x′i, y′i, z′i : 1 ≤ i ≤ n′} in the first
three positions, and if it contains one, then it is in top position.
Formally, the instance 〈N,X, PX , 3, x∗〉 of the possible cowinner problem for 3-approval and 3 new
candidates is described as follows: the set of voters is N = N1 ∪ N2 where N1 = {ve : e ∈ C} and
N2 = NA ∪ NB ∪ NC ∪ Nx∗ , the set of candidates is X = X1 ∪ X2. For the candidates in X , we have x∗
together with :
• X1 = X ′ ∪ Y ′ ∪ Z ′ where X ′ = {x′1, . . . , x′n′}, Y ′ = {y′1, . . . , y′n′} and Z ′ = {z′1, . . . , z′n′}.
• X2 = {x∗i : 1 ≤ i ≤ 2n
′} ∪ {xji : 1 ≤ i ≤ n
′
, 1 ≤ j ≤ 2 (n′ − d(xi) + 1)} ∪ {y
j
i : 1 ≤ i ≤ n
′
,
1 ≤ j ≤ 2 (n′ − d(yi) + 1)} ∪ {z
j
i : 1 ≤ i ≤ n
′
, 1 ≤ j ≤ 2 (n′ − d(zi) + 1)}.
Note that n′ − d(xi) + 1 ≥ 1 since d(z) ≤ 3 ≤ n′.
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For each voter vi ∈ N , we only indicate her first three candidates (in the order of preference). The set of
all X-votes PX of the voters in N is as follows :
• NA = {v
A
i,j : 1 ≤ i ≤ n
′
, 0 ≤ j ≤ (n′ − d(xi))}. The vote of vAi,j is (x′i, x
2j+1
i , x
2j+2
i ).
• NB = {vBi,j : 1 ≤ i ≤ n
′
, 0 ≤ j ≤ (n′ − d(yi))}. The vote of vBi,j is (y′i, y
2j+1
i , y
2j+2
i ).
• NC = {v
C
i,j : 1 ≤ i ≤ n
′
, 0 ≤ j ≤ (n′ − d(zi))}. The vote of vCi,j is (z′i, z
2j+1
i , z
2j+2
i ).
• N1 = {ve : e ∈ C}. The vote of ve is (x′i, y′j , z′k) where e = (ai, bj , ck) ∈ C.
• Nx∗ = {v
x∗
j : 0 ≤ j ≤ n
′ − 1}. The vote of vx∗j is (x∗, x∗2j+1, x∗2j+2).
We claim that I admits a perfect matching M ⊆ C if and only if x∗ becomes a possible cowinner by adding
three new candidates.
Let Y = {y1, y2, y3} be the new candidates added. Since we cannot increase the score of x∗, we must
decrease by one point the scores of candidates of X ′ ∪ Y ′ ∪ Z ′. Let us focus on candidates in X ′. In order
to reduce the score of x′i, we must modify the votes of voters in N1 or in NA. By construction, each such
voter must put y1, y2, y3 in the first three positions (since in NA or from (ii), candidates of X ′ are put in top
position when they appear in the first three positions) and then, the score of each yi increases by 1 at each time.
Since there are n′ candidates in X ′, we deduce S3(yi, P ) ≥ n′ for every i = 1, 2, 3. On the other hand, if x∗
becomes a cowinner, S3(yi, P ) ≤ S3(x∗, P ) ≤ S3(x∗, PX) = n′ from (i). Thus, S3(yi, P ) = n′ for every
i = 1, 2, 3 and there are exactly n′ voters N ′ which put y1, y2, y3 in the first three positions (for the remaining
voters of N \N ′, yi is ranked in position at least 4 for every i = 1, 2, 3).
We claim that N ′ ⊆ N1. Otherwise, at least one voter of NA put y1, y2, y3 in the first three positions.
There remains at most n′ − 1 voters of N ′ to decrease by 1 the score of candidates in Y ′. It is impossible
because |Y ′| = n′ and, from (ii) and by construction of N1, each candidate of Y ′ appears at most once in the
first three positions for all voters. Finally, since the score of candidates in Y ′ ∪Z ′ must also decrease by 1, we
deduce that x∗ is a possible cowinner iff M = {e ∈ C : y1, y2, y3 are in the first three positions for voter ve}
is a perfect matching of C. 
4.6 General case
We finalize the study of the possible cowinner problem for K-approval with respect to candidate addition by
showing that the problem is hard in any other case. For this we proceed in two steps: we first prove that for
each k ≥ 3, the problem PCWNC(k) for 3-approval is NP-complete (Lemma 4). Next we prove that if the
problem PCWNC(k) for K-approval is NP-complete then it is also the case for the problem PCWNC(k) for
(K + 1)-approval (Lemma 5).
Lemma 4 For all k ≥ 3, the problem PCWNC(k) for 3-approval can be reduced in polynomial-time to the
problem PCWNC(k + 1) for 3-approval.
Proof: Let 〈N,X, PX , k, x∗〉, where P = PX = 〈V1, . . . , Vn〉, be an instance of PCWNC(k) for 3-approval.
Assume S3(x∗, P ) ≥ 1 (otherwise, the problem is trivial). Consider the following instance 〈N ′, X ′, QX′ , k +
1, x∗〉 of the PCWNC(k + 1) for 3-approval:
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• the set of candidates is X ′ = X ∪ {z} ∪ {t1i , t2i | 1 ≤ i ≤ 2S3(x∗, P )};
• there are n+ 2S3(x∗, P ) votes:
– for every vote Vj in P we have a vote Wj in Q whose first three candidates are the same as in Vj
and in the same order, and the other candidates are in an arbitrary order.
– for every i = 1, . . . , 2S3(x∗, P ), we have a vote Ui in which the first 3 candidates are t1i , t2i , z, the
remaining candidates being ranked arbitrarily.
Assume x∗ is a possible cowinner for P = PX (w.r.t. the addition of k new candidates) and let P ′ be
an extension of P where x∗ is a cowinner. Let Y = {y1, . . . , yk} denote the new candidates for the instance
〈N,X, PX , k〉, and Y ′ = {y1, . . . , yk+1} the new candidates for the instance 〈N ′, X ′, QX′ , k + 1〉. Consider
the following extension Q′ of Q = QX′ : for every vote V ′j of P ′ we have a vote W ′j in Q′ whose 3 first
candidates are the same as in V ′j (and the remaining ones in an arbitrary order); and for every vote Ui such that
1 ≤ i ≤ S3(x∗, P ) we have a vote U ′i whose first 3 candidates are yk+1, t1i , t2i and for every vote Ui such that
S3(x
∗, P ) + 1 ≤ i ≤ 2S3(x∗, P ), we have a vote U ′i whose first 3 candidates are t1i , t2i , z. It is easy to check
that Q′ is an extension of Q. The scores of all candidates in X ∪ Y are the same in P ′ and Q′, while the score
of each t1i , t2i is 1, the scores of z and of yk+1 are S3(x∗, P ); therefore x∗ is a cowinner in Q′ and a possible
cowinner in Q.
Conversely, assume x∗ is a possible cowinner in Q = QX′ and let Q′ be an extension of Q in which x∗ is
a cowinner. We are now going to reason abut the number of occurrences of the new candidates y1, . . . , yk+1
in the first three positions of the votes of Q′. For the sake of notation, for any vote V we denote S3(Y ′, V ) =∑
y∈Y ′ S3(y
′, V ): in words, S3(Y ′, V ) is the number of new candidates in the first three positions of V .
Similarly, if R is a profile, we denote S3(Y ′, R) =
∑
y∈Y ′ S3(y
′, R).
Without loss of generality, we assume that S3(x∗, Q′) = S3(x∗, Q) = S3(x∗, P ), since under 3-approval
it is never beneficial to decrease the score of x∗ to make it a possible cowinner. We have S3(z,Q′) ≤
S3(x
∗, Q′) = S3(x
∗, P ) and S3(z,Q) = 2S3(x∗, P ), therefore a new candidate must be put above z in at
least S3(x∗, P ) votes U ′i ; therefore,
2S3(x
∗,P )∑
j=1
S3(Y
′, Ui) ≥ S3(x
∗, P ) (1)
Now, S3(Y ′, Q′) =
∑n
i=1 S3(Y
′,Wi) +
∑2S3(x∗,P )
j=1 S3(Y
′, Ui), which together with (1) entails
n∑
i=1
S3(Y
′,Wi) ≤ S3(Y
′, Q′)− S3(x
∗, P ) (2)
Now, x∗ is a cowinner in Q′, therefore, for all yj ∈ Y ′ we have S3(yj , Q′) ≤ S3(x∗, Q′) = S3(x∗, P ), from
which we get
S3(Y
′, Q′) ≤ (k + 1)S3(x
∗, P ) (3)
From (2) and (3) we get
n∑
i=1
S3(Y
′,Wi) ≤ kS3(x
∗, P ) (4)
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Now, consider the extension P ′ of P built from the restriction of Q′ to {W ′1, . . . ,W ′n} by changing the candi-
dates in Y placed in the first three positions in such a way that each candidate appears at most in S3(x∗, P )
votes, which is made possible by (4). We have:
• S3(x∗, P ′) = S3(x∗, P ′);
• for each y ∈ Y , S3(y, P ′) ≤ S3(x∗, P ) = S3(x∗, P ′);
• for each x ∈ X \ {x∗}, S3(x, P ′) = S3(x,Q′); because x∗ is a possible cowinner in Q′, we have
S3(x,Q
′) ≤ S3(x∗, Q′) = S3(x∗, P ), therefore, S3(x, P ′) ≤ S3(x∗, P ) = S3(x∗, P ′).
From this we conclude that x∗ is a possible cowinner in P ′. 
Lemma 5 The problem PCWNC(k + 1) for K-approval can be reduced in polynomial-time to the problem
PCWNC(k) for (K + 1)-approval.
Proof: Let 〈N,X, PX , k, x∗〉 where PX = 〈V1, . . . , Vn〉 be an instance of PcWNC(k) for K-approval. Con-
sider the following instance 〈N ′, X ′, RX′ , k, x∗〉 of the PcWNC(k) for (K + 1)-approval:
• the set of candidates is X ′ = X ∪ {ti | 1 ≤ i ≤ n};
• for every vote Vi in P we have a vote Wi in R whose top candidate is ti and the candidates ranked in
position 2 to K + 1 are the candidates ranked in positions 1 to K in Vi, the remaining candidates being
ranked arbitrarily.
Assume x∗ is a possible cowinner for P = PX and let P ′ = 〈V ′1 , . . . , V ′n〉 be an extension of P where
x∗ is a cowinner. Denote by y1, . . . , yk the new candidates. Consider the extension R′ = 〈W ′1, . . . ,W ′n〉 of
R = RX′ where W ′i ranks ti first and then the candidates ranked in the first K positions in V ′i . For every
x ∈ X we have SK+1(x,R′) = SK(x, P ′); for every i = 1, . . . , k we have SK+1(yi, R′) = SK(yi, P ′); and
for every j = 1, . . . , n, we have SK+1(tj , R′) = 1. Therefore x∗ is a possible cowinner in R′ and a possible
cowinner in R.
Conversely, assume x∗ is a possible cowinner in R = RX′ and let R′ = 〈W ′1, . . . ,W ′n〉 be a completion of
R in which it is a possible cowinner. Since none of the ti threatens x∗, without loss of generality we assume
ti still appears in the first K + 1 positions of W ′i—otherwise, change W ′i by moving ti to the top of W ′i .
Consider now the extension P ′ = 〈V ′1 , . . . , V ′n〉 of P = PX where V ′i is obtained from W ′i by removing all
the t’s. Since exactly one ti appears in the first K + 1 positions of W ′i , the K candidates approved in V ′i are
exactly the K + 1 candidates approved in W ′i minus ti. From this we conclude that for every x ∈ X we have
SK+1(x, P
′) = SK(x,R
′) and for every i = 1, . . . , k we have SK+1(yi, P ′) = SK(yi, R′). Therefore x∗ is a
possible cowinner in P ′ and a possible cowinner in P . 
Proposition 7 Deciding whether a candidate is a possible cowinner for K-approval with respect to the addi-
tion of k new candidates is NP-complete for each (K, k) such that K ≥ 3 and k ≥ 3.
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Proof: Since deciding whether x∗ is a possible cowinner for 3-approval with respect to the addition of 3 new
candidates is NP-hard, using inductively the reductions of Lemma 4 and Lemma 5 shows that NP-hardness
propagates to every (K, k) ≥ (3, 3). Hence, the problem PcWNC(k) for K-approval is NP-complete for any
fixed pair of values K ≥ 3 and k ≥ 3. 
We summarize the results obtained in this Section by the following table:
k = 1 k = 2 k ≥ 3
plurality P (Prop. 1) P (Prop. 1) P (Prop. 1)
2-approval P (Prop. 2) P (Coro. 1) P (Coro. 1)
K-approval,K ≥ 3 P (Prop. 2) P (Prop. 5) NP-complete (Prop. 7)
Observe that it would also be possible to address the PCWNC(k) problem (for K ≥ 3 and k ≥ 3) by
working out a direct polynomial reduction from 3-DM, as done in Proposition 6. This would however result
in a much less readable proof. One further interest of the proposed reduction is to show how it is possible
to “neutralize” the (extended) power induced by adding more candidates by also adding one more (dummy)
candidate in the initial instance. Intuitively, by setting the score of dummy candidate t to 2SK(x∗, P ), a single
new candidate yi will have to be “consumed” to ensure that t does not win. More generally, the same proof
holds even if K and k depend on the instance (i.e. are not constant). If we allow f(n) new candidates (where
f is polynomially bounded function) instead of k a constant, the hardness result also holds (in the proof of
Lemma 4, we duplicate each vote V f(n) times by adding candidates zi for i = 1, . . . , f(n) instead of z and
we add dummy voters and candidates). Formally, we replace the construction given in Lemma 4 by:
• the set of candidates is X ′ = X ∪ {z1, . . . , zf(n)} ∪ {t1i,ℓ, t2i,ℓ | 1 ≤ i ≤ 2S3(x∗, P ), 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ f(n)};
• there are n+ 2f(n)S3(x∗, P ) votes:
– for every vote Vj in P we have a vote Wj in Q whose first three candidates are the same as in Vj
and in the same order, and the other candidates are in an arbitrary order.
– for every i = 1, . . . , 2S3(x∗, P ) and ℓ = 1, . . . , f(n), we have a vote Ui,ℓ in which the first 3
candidates are t1i,ℓ, t2i,ℓ, zℓ, the remaining candidates being ranked arbitrarily.
Finally, Y ′ = {y1, . . . , yk+f(n)} are the new candidates.
Thus, using above construction, Lemma 4 and Proposition 6, we obtain that for any ε ∈ (0; 1), PCWNC(f(n))
for 3-approval is an NP-complete problem where f(n) = Θ(|N |1−ε) = Θ(|X |1−ε) (by setting f(n) = |N |r
in the above construction where r is a constant arbitrarily large). On the other hand, PCWNC(f(n)) for K-
approval is a problem which can be solved in polynomial time when f(n) = K · |N |, i.e., when the number of
new candidates is K times the number of voters.
Note that some candidates (other than the new candidates) can be necessary cowinners with K-approval.
Specifically, each candidate xi such that SK−k(PX , xi) = n is a necessary cowinner, since she is approved by
all voters and there are not enough new candidates to push her (in at least one vote) out of the set of approved
candidates.
5 Borda
Let us now consider the Borda rule (rB). Characterizing possible Borda cowinners when adding candidates is
easy due to the following lemma:
Lemma 6 Let PX be an X-profile where X = {x∗} ∪ {x1, . . . , xp} and let Y = {y1, . . . , yk} be a set of k
new candidates. Let r~s be a scoring rule for p+k candidates1 defined by the vector ~s = 〈s1, . . . , sp, . . . , sp+k〉
such that (si − si+1) ≤ (si+1 − si+2) for all i. x∗ ∈ X is a possible cowinner for PX w.r.t. the addition of k
new candidates for the scoring rule r~s(P ) iff x∗ ∈ r(P ) where P is the profile on X ∪ Y obtained from PX by
putting y1, . . . , yk right below x∗ (in arbitrary order) in every vote of PX .
Proof: We show that it is never strictly better to put the new candidates anywhere but right below x in the new
profile. Let P be an extension of PX in which x∗ is a cowinner, and assume there is a vote V ∈ P and a new
candidate y such that either (i) y ≻v x∗ or (ii) there exists at least one candidate x′ such that x∗ ≻v x′ ≻v y.
If we are in case (i), let us move y right below x∗; let V ′ be the resulting vote, and P ′ the resulting
profile. Obviously, S~s(y, P ′) ≤ S~s(y, P ) and S~s(x∗, P ′) ≥ S~s(x∗, P ), therefore S~s(x∗, P ′) ≥ S~s(y, P ′). For
each candidate z such that y ≻v z ≻v x∗, let i be the rank of z in v and j > i be the rank of x∗ in v. Then
(S~s(z, P
′)−S~s(x
∗, P ′))−(S~s(z, P )−S~s(x
∗, P )) = (si−1−sj−1)−(si−sj) = (si−1−si)−(sj−1−sj) ≤ 0,
therefore S~s(x∗, P ′) ≥ S~s(z, P ′). The scores of all other candidates are left unchanged, therefore x∗ is still a
cowinner in P ′. By applying this process iteratively for all new candidates and in all votes until (i) no longer
holds, we obtain a profile Q in which x∗ is a cowinner, and such that x∗ is ranked above all new candidates in
every vote.
Now, if (ii) holds for some new candidate y and some vote V of Q, then we move y upwards, right below
x∗; let V ′ be the resulting vote and Q′ the resulting profile. The score of y improves, but since y is still
ranked above all new candidates in every vote of Q′, we have S~s(x∗, Q′) ≥ S~s(y,Q′). For each candidate
z ∈ X ∪ Y \ {x∗, y} such that x∗ ≻v z ≻v y in vote V , z moves down one position in Q′, therefore
S~s(z,Q
′) ≤ S~s(x
′, Q) ≤ S~s(x
∗, Q) = S~s(x
∗, Q′). The scores of all other candidates do not change, therefore
x∗ is still a cowinner in Q′. By applying this process iteratively and in all votes, until (ii) no longer holds, and
we obtain a profile in which x∗ is a cowinner and neither (i) nor (ii) holds.
We conclude that x∗ is a possible cowinner for a profile if and only if it is a cowinner in an extension of the
profile where all new candidates have been placed right below x∗. 
In words, Lemma 6 applies to the rules where the difference of scores between successive ranks can only
become smaller or remain constant as we come closer to the highest ranks. This condition is satisfied by
Borda (but not by plurality), by veto, and by rules such as “lexicographic veto”, where the scoring vector is
〈Mp,Mp −M,Mp −M2, . . . ,Mp −Mp−1, 0〉 where M > n.
The following result then easily follows:
Proposition 8 Let PX be an X-profile where X = {x∗} ∪ {x1, . . . , xp} and let Y = {y1, . . . , yk} be a set
of k new candidates. A candidate x∗ is a possible cowinner for Borda with respect to the addition of k new
1In this lemma we do not have to deal with profiles with less than p+ k candidates, therefore it is not necessary to mention how rs is
derived for fewer candidates than p+ k.
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candidates if and only if
k ≥ max
z∈X\{x∗}
SB(z, PX)− SB(x∗, PX)
NPX (x
∗, z)
Proof: By Lemma 6, x∗ a possible cowinner if and only if it is a cowinner in the X ∪ {y1, . . . , yk}-completion
P of PX where y1, . . . , yk are placed right below x∗, that is, if and only if SB(x∗, P ) = SB(x∗, PX) + kn.
Now, for each vote, all candidates in X \ {x∗} ranked above x∗ get k additional points in the extended vote,
while those ranked below x∗ keep the same score. Hence, for every z ∈ X \ {x∗} we have SB(z, P ) =
SB(z, PX) + k(n − NPX (x
∗, z)), therefore, x∗ is a cowinner in P if and only if SB(x∗, PX) + kn ≥
SB(z, PX) + k(n − NPX (x
∗, z)), which is equivalent to k ≥ [SB(z, PX) − SB(x∗, PX)]/NPX (x∗, z). (We
recall that NPX (x∗, z) stands for the number of votes in PX ranking x∗ above z). 
In words, checking whether x∗ is a possible cowinner boils down to checking, for each other candidate
z, whether there are enough votes where x∗ is preferred to z to compensate for the score difference with this
candidate. This means that possible cowinners with respect to adding any number of new candidates can be
computed in polynomial time for Borda, and more generally for any rule satisfying the conditions of Lemma
6. Note that computing possible winners for Borda is NP-hard [30], therefore, the restriction of the problem to
candidate addition induces a complexity reduction.
Example 3 Take X = {a, b, c, d}, n = 4, and PX = 〈bacd, bacd, bacd, dacb〉. The Borda scores in PX are
SB(a, PX) = 8, SB(b, PX) = 9, SB(c, PX) = 3, and SB(d, PX) = 4, while N(a, b) = 1, N(a, c) = 4,
N(a, d) = 3, N(b, c) = 3, N(b, d) = 3, N(c, d) = 3, and for all x, y, N(x, y) = 4 − N(y, x). Let
δ(x, z) = SB(z, PX) − SB(x, PX)/NPX (x, z). The following matrix gives the values of δ(x, z) for the
possible pairs of distinct candidates (for the sake of readability, non-positive values are denoted by ≤ 0).
δ(x, z) a b c d max
a − 1 ≤ 0 ≤ 0 1
b ≤ 0 − ≤ 0 ≤ 0 ≤ 0
c +∞ 5 − ≤ 0 +∞
d 5 6 1 − 6
Applying Proposition 8, b is a possible cowinner whatever the value of k, a is a possible cowinner if and only
if k ≥ 1, d is a possible cowinner if and only if k ≥ 6, c is not a possible cowinner whatever the value of k2.
Note that for k ≥ 6, d is a possible cowinner whereas c is not, although c has a higher Borda score than d in
PX .
6 Hardness with a single new candidate
Even though we have seen that the possible cowinner problem can be NP-hard for some scoring rules, NP-
hardness required the addition of several new candidates. We now show that there exists a scoring rule for
which the possible cowinner problem is NP-hard with respect to the addition of one new candidate.
2This is so because c is always ranked below a. We make this intuition clear in Section 7.
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The scoring rule we use is very simple: it allows each voter to approve exactly 3 candidates, and offers 3
different levels of approval (assigning respectively 3,2,1 points to the three preferred candidates). Let r∆ be
the scoring rule defined by the vector ~s = 〈3, 2, 1, 0, . . . , 0〉 with m− 3 0’s completing the vector.
Proposition 9 Deciding if x∗ is a possible cowinner for r∆ with respect to the addition of one candidate is
NP-complete.
Proof: This problem is clearly in NP. The hardness proof is quite similar to that of Proposition 6. Let I =
(C, A × B × C) be an instance of 3-DM with n′ ≥ 5 and ∀z ∈ A ∪ B ∪ C, d(z) ∈ {2, 3}. From I , we
build an instance 〈N,X, PX , 1, x∗〉 of the PcWNC problem as follows. The set X of candidates contains x∗,
X1 = {x′i, y
′
i, z
′
i : 1 ≤ i ≤ n
′} where x′i, y′i, z′i correspond to elements of A, B and C respectively and a set
X2 of dummy candidates. The set N of voters contains N1 = {ve : e ∈ C} and a set N2 of dummy voters.
For each voter vi ∈ N , we only indicate the vote for the first three candidates. So, the vote Vi = (t1, t2, t3)
means that candidate ti receives 4− i points. The vote Ve of voter ve is (x′i, y′j , z′k) where e = (ai, bj, ck) ∈ C.
The preferences of dummy voters are such that (a) the score of the candidates in X satisfies ∀x ∈ X1,
S~s(x, PX) = 3n
′+1, S~s(x
∗, PX) = 3n
′ and ∀x ∈ X2, S~s(x, PX) ≤ 3 and (b) each voter in N2 ranks at most
one candidate of {x′i, y′i, z′i : 1 ≤ i ≤ n′} in the first three positions, and if he ranks one in second position,
then x∗ occurs in third position.
Formally, the instance of the PcWNC problem is built as follows. The set of voters is N = N1 ∪N2 where
N1 = {ve : e ∈ C} and N2 = NA ∪ NB ∪ NC ∪ Nx∗ , the set of candidates is X = X1 ∪ X2 ∪ {x∗}
where X1 = X ′ ∪ Y ′ ∪ Z ′ with X ′ = {x′1, . . . , x′n′}, Y ′ = {y′1, . . . , y′n′}, Z ′ = {z′1, . . . , z′n′} and
X2 = XA ∪XB ∪XC ∪Xx∗ . These sets are defined as follows:
• XA = {x
j
i : 1 ≤ i ≤ n
′
, 1 ≤ j ≤ 2 (n′ − d(ai))}.
• XB = {y
j
i : 1 ≤ i ≤ n
′
, 1 ≤ j ≤ 2 (3n′ − 2d(bi) + 1)}.
• XC = {z
j
i : 1 ≤ i ≤ n
′
, 1 ≤ j ≤ 2 (3n′ − d(ci) + 1)}.
• Xx∗ = {x∗i : i = 1 ≤ i ≤ 2n
′}.
The set of all X-votes PX is given by:
• NA = {vAi,j : 1 ≤ i ≤ n
′
, 0 ≤ j ≤ (n′ − d(ai)− 2)} ∪ {v
A,j
i : 1 ≤ i ≤ n
′
, j = 1, 2}. The
vote V Ai,j of vAi,j is V Ai,j = (x′i, x
2j+1
i , x
2j+2
i ). Note that n′ − d(ai) − 2 ≥ 0. The vote of v
A,j
i is
V A,ji = (x
2(n′−d(ai)−1)+j
i , x
′
i, x
∗).
• NB = {vBi,j : 1 ≤ i ≤ n
′
, 0 ≤ j ≤ 3n′ − 2d(bi)}. The vote of vBi,j is V Bi,j = (y
2j+1
i , y
2j+2
i , y
′
i).
• NC = {vCi,j : 1 ≤ i ≤ n
′
, 0 ≤ j ≤ 3n′ − d(ci)}. The vote of vCi,j is V Ci,j = (z
2j+1
i , z
2j+2
i , z
′
i).
• Nx∗ = {vx
∗
j : 0 ≤ j ≤ n
′ − 1}. The vote of vx∗j is V x
∗
j = (v
x∗
2j+1, v
x∗
2j+2, x
∗). Note that n′ − 1 ≥ 0.
• N1 = {ve : e ∈ C}. The vote of ve is Ve = (x′i, y′j , z′k) where e = (ai, bj, ck) ∈ C.
We claim that I admits a perfect matching M ⊆ C if and only if x∗ becomes a possible cowinner by adding
a new candidate y1. Observe that the scores of the candidates in X satisfy:
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(i) ∀x ∈ X1, S~s(x, PX) = 3n
′ + 1.
(ii) S~s(x
∗, PX) = 3n
′
.
(iii) ∀x ∈ X2, S~s(x, PX) ≤ 3.
Items (i), (ii) and (iii) correspond to the conditions (a) and (b) described previously. For instance, each
candidate x′i from X1 gets respectively 3, 3, and 2 points from the votes Ve, V Ai,j , and V
A,j
i , summing up to
3d(ai) + 3(n
′ − d(ai) − 1) + 2 = 3n′ + 1. The reader can easily check that the conditions also hold for all
other candidates.
Let y1 be the new candidate. By construction of this scoring rule, we must decrease the score of candidates
in X which dominate the score of x∗, that is the candidates of X1 using (i) and (iii).
Let P ′ be a X ∪ {y1}-profile such that x∗ is a cowinner. Let us focus on candidates in X ′. In order to
reduce the score of x′i by 1, we must modify the preference for at least one voter ve or vAi,j or v
A,j
i . If we
modify it for some voter in vA,ji , then the score of x′i (with respect to vA,ji ) decreases by one if and only if the
score of x∗ (with respect to vA,ji ) also decreases by one. In conclusion, we must modify the preference of x′i
for at least one voter ve or vAi,j . By construction, each such voter must put y1 in top position and then, the score
of y1 increases by 3 at each time. Since there are n′ candidates in X ′, we deduce S~s′(y1, P
′) ≥ 3n′; From
above remark, we also get S~s′(x
∗, P ′) ≤ S~s′(x
∗, PX) = 3n
′
. Thus for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n′}, exactly one voter
among those of ve or vAi,j must put candidate y1 in top position. Finally, if it is one voter vAi,j , then we deduce
S~s′(y1, P
′) > 3n because the score of Y ′ ∪ Z ′ must also decrease, which is not possible since y1 will then
win.
Following a line of reasoning similar to the one developed in the proof of Proposition 6, we conclude that
for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n′}, exactly one voter among those of ve must put candidate y1 in top position. Since the
score of Y ′∪Z ′ must also decrease by 1, we deduce that x∗ is a possible cowinner if and only if M = {e ∈ C :
y1 is in top position in vote Ve} is a perfect matching of C (for the remaining voters, y1 is put in last position). 
This rule shows that it may be difficult to identify possible cowinners with a single additional candidate.
Giving a characterization of all rules possessing this property is an open problem.
7 Related work
7.1 The possible winner problem
The possible winner problem was introduced in [22]: given an incomplete profile P = 〈V1, . . . , Vn〉 where
each Vi is a partial order over the set of candidates X , x is a possible winner for P given a voting rule r if
there exists a complete extension P ′ = 〈V ′1 , . . . , V ′n〉 of P , where each V ′i is a linear order on X extending Vi,
such that r(P ′) = x. Possible winners are defined in a similar way for a voting correspondence C, in which
case we say that x is a possible cowinner if there exists an extension P ′ of P such that x ∈ C(P ′). Clearly,
the possible winner problem defined in this paper is a restriction of the general possible winner problem to the
following set of incomplete profiles:
(Restr) there exists X ′ ⊆ X such that for every i, Vi is a linear order on X ′
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As an immediate corollary, the complexity of the possible (co)winner problem with respect to candidate addi-
tion is at most as difficult as that of the general problem. This raises the question whether (Restr) leads to a
complexity reduction for the scoring rules we have considered here.
The possible (co)winner problem for scoring rules has received a significant amount of attention in the
last years. Xia and Conitzer [30] proved that the problem was NP-complete for the Borda rule, and more
generally for scoring rules whose scoring vector contains four consecutive, equally decreasing values, followed
by another strictly decreasing value. Betzler and Dorn [5] went further by showing that NP-completeness holds
more generally for all pure3 scoring rules, except plurality, veto, and scoring rules whose vector sm is of the
form sm = 〈2, 1, . . . , 1, 0〉 for large enough values ofm. The issue was finally closed by Baumeister and Rothe
[3], who showed that the problem for sm = 〈2, 1, . . . , 1, 0〉 is NP-complete as well. These results compare
to ours in the following way: all our NP-hardness results strengthen the known NP-hardness results for the
general possible winner problem, while our polynomiality results show a complexity reduction induced by
(Restr).
Two recent papers give results about the PCWNC problem for other voting rules. Xia et al. [33] give
results about the possible (co)winner with new candidates for other voting rules: they showed that PWNC and
PCWNC are NP-complete for Bucklin and maximin, that PCWNC is NP-complete for Copeland0, and they
give several results for approval voting, depending on how the extension a vote is defined. Baumeister et al.
[4] generalize our Proposition 9 by showing that the PCWNC problem is NP-complete for any pure scoring
rule of the form 〈α1, α2, 1; 0, . . . , 0〉; they also give NP-completeness results for plurality and 2-approval when
voters are weighted.
Results about the PCWNC known so far (except our Proposition 9 and its generalization by [4]) are sum-
marized in the following table. For the sake of completeness, we also mention the complexity of the other
prominent subproblem of the possible cowinner problem, namely unweighted coalitional manipulation.
general problem candidate addition manipulation
plurality and veto P P (Prop. 1) P
Borda NP-complete [30] P (Prop. 8) NP-complete [7, 12]
2-approval NP-complete [5] P (Coro. 1) P
K-approval, K ≥ 3 NP-complete [5] NP-complete (Prop. 6) P
Bucklin NP-complete [30] NP-complete [33] P [32]
maximin NP-complete [30] NP-complete [33] NP-complete [32]
Copeland0 NP-complete [30] NP-complete [33] NP-complete [16]
Another interesting line of work is the parameterized complexity of the possible winner problem for scor-
ing rules, which has been investigated in [6]. Among other results, they show that for all scoring rules, the
problem is fixed-parameter tractable with respect to the number of candidates (in particular, when the number
of candidates is bounded by a constant, the problem becomes polynomial-time solvable). This polynomiality
result clearly holds in the possible winner problem with respect to candidate addition, with some caution: the
number of candidates here is the total number of candidates (the initial ones plus the new ones); this result has
practical impact in some situations mentioned in the introduction, such as finding a date for a meeting, where
the number of candidates is typically low.
3A (family of) scoring rules (rm)m≥1 is pure if for each m, the scoring vector for m + 1 candidates is obtained from the scoring
vector for m candidates by inserting an additional score at an arbitrary position. All interesting families of scoring rules are pure; this is
in particular the case for K-approval and Borda.
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We end this subsection by mentioning other works on the possible winner problem and its variants and
subproblems, that are less directly connected to our results. The possible winner problem has also been studied
from the probabilistic point of view by Bachrach et al. [1], where the aim is to count the number of extensions
in which a given candidate is the winner. Such a probabilistic analysis is highly relevant in candidate-adding
situations: given PX , a number k of new candidates, and a prior probability distribution on votes, computing
the probability that a given candidate x ∈ X will be the winner, or that one of the initial (resp. new) candidates
will be the winner, is extremely interesting.4
7.2 Control via adding candidates
The possible winners with respect to the addition of candidates is highly reminiscent of constructive control
by the chair via adding candidates — this problem first appeared in [2] and was later studied in more depth
for many voting rules, see e.g., [21, 17]. However, even if a voting situation where new candidates are added
looks similar to an instance of constructive control by adding candidates, these problems differ significantly.
In control via adding candidates, the input consists of a set of candidates X , a set of “spoiler” candidates Y ,
and a full profile PX∪Y : the chair knows how the voters would vote on the new candidates; the problem is to
determine whether a given candidate x∗ can be made a winner by adding at most k ≤ |Y | candidates from Y .
In the possible winner problem with respect to candidate addition, we have to take into account all possible
ways for voters to rank the new candidates. In spite of their significant differences, there is a straightforward
connection between these problems: if an instance 〈N,X, PX∪Y , x∗, k〉 of control via adding candidates is
positive, then x∗ is a possible winner in PX with respect to the addition of k new candidates (the voting rule
being the same in both problems).
Bartholdi et al. [2] noted that a voting rule is immune to control by adding candidates as soon as it satisfies
the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP), which requires that the winner among a set of candidates
W to be the winner among every subset of candidates to which he belongs [27]; formally: for any Z ⊆ W , if
r(PW ) ∈ Z then r(PZ ) = r(PW ). This property can be used in a similar way for the possible winner problem
with respect to candidate addition. Obviously, if the voting rule r satisfies WARP, then any possible winner
from X is a winner for the current profile PX 5. Unfortunately, this social-choice theoretic property is very
strong: [13] show that a voting rule satisfies this property (there, it is called candidate stability) and unanimity
if and only if it is dictatorial.
7.3 Cloning
Finally, the possible winner problem via candidate addition is closely related to manipulation by candidate
cloning. Independence of clones was first studied in [28], further studied in [24, 23], and a variant of this
4Note that if the voting rule is insensitive to the identity of candidates (i.e. neutral), then although the prior probability that one of
the k new candidates will be a cowinner under the impartial culture assumption is at least k
|X|+k
, this is no longer the case when PX is
known: for instance, let us use plurality and consider the profile PX = 〈ab, ab, ab〉, and let the number of new candidates be one. For a
third candidate to be a cowinner, he either needs to be placed first in all three votes (which occurs with probability 1
27
), or to be placed first
in two votes, but not in the third vote (which occurs with probability 6
27
); therefore the probability that the new candidate is a cowinner in
the completed profile is only 7
27
.
5In order for the converse to hold, we must add one more condition, such as consensus (a Pareto-dominated candidate cannot be
elected). Then, if the winner for the current profile PX is x, by ranking all new candidates at the bottom of all votes, none of them can
be the winner in PX∪Y , and by WARP, no candidate x′ ∈ X \ {x} can either, therefore x is a possible winner for PX with respect to
candidate addition.
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property was recently considered from the computational point of view in [14]. The main difference between
x being a possible winner with respect to candidate addition and the existence of a candidate cloning strategy
so that x or one of its clones becomes the winner, as in [14], is that candidate cloning requires a candidate
and its clones to be contiguous in all votes. In other terms, whereas our problem considers the introduction of
genuinely new candidates, cloning merely introduces copies of existing ones.
The complexity of this problem is considered by Elkind et al. [14] for several voting rules. Although the
proposed model allows for the possibility of having a bounded number of new clones (via a notion of cost),
most of their results focus on the case of unboundedly many clones. Therefore, to be able to compare their
results with ours, we should first say something about the variant of the possible winner problem with respect
to candidate addition, when the number of new candidates is not known beforehand and can be arbitrarily
large. The definitions of voting situations and possible winners are straightforward adaptations of Definitions
1 and 2: a voting situation is now a triple Σ = 〈N,X, PX〉 and x∗ is a possible cowinner with respect to Σ and
r if there exists an integer k and a set Y of cardinality k such that there is a (X ∪ Y )-profile P extending PX
such that x∗ ∈ r(P ). We now give a necessary and sufficient condition for a candidate to be a possible winner,
for a class of scoring rules including the Borda rule.
Proposition 10 Let S be a collection of scoring vectors (sm),m ≥ 1, such that
• for every p, (smj ), 1 ≤ j ≤ m is strictly decreasing;
• for all j, j′ ∈ N, (1) limm→∞ s
m
j −s
m
j′
s1
= 0 and (2) limm→∞ s
m
j −s
m
m−j′
s1
= 1.
Then, x∗ is a possible winner w.r.t. 〈N,X, PX ,+∞〉 if and only if it is undominated6 in PX .
Proof: First, suppose x∗ is undominated in PX . For any candidate xi 6= x∗, define ∆vi as the difference be-
tween the score of x∗ and the score of xi, divided by s1, in the vote v. As in the construction of Lemma 1,
put k new candidates right below x∗ in every vote, and let P ′ be the resulting profile. As the value of k grows,
for any vote v ranking candidate x∗ below xi, the value of ∆vi will tend towards 0 (by condition 1). Also,
condition 2 ensures that for each vote v ranking x∗ above xi, the value of ∆vi tends towards 1. Because x∗
is undominated, such votes always exist for every candidate xi 6= x∗. Therefore, when k grows,
∑
v∈P ′ ∆
v
i
tends towards the number of votes ranking x∗ above xi, which is at least 1. This implies that the score of x∗
will be eventually larger than the score of xi, and this is true for every xi 6= x∗, therefore x∗ will eventually
become the winner as k grows. Conversely, suppose x∗ is dominated by some candidate xi. Because the scores
(smj ), 1 ≤ j ≤ m are strictly decreasing, the score of x will always remain strictly below the score of xi in the
completion of the profile, hence x∗ is not a possible cowinner. 
Clearly, this large class of voting rules includes Borda, since it satisfies the conditions of Proposition 10.
However, it does not include plurality, and more generally K-approval, which violate condition (1). Still, a
very simple condition can be stated for K-approval: a candidate is a possible winner as soon as it is approved
at least once.
Proposition 11 When r is K-approval, x∗ is a possible winner w.r.t. the addition of an unbounded number of
new candidates if and only if SK(x∗, PX) ≥ 1.
6We recall that candidate x dominates candidate x′ if every voter ranks x above x′, and that a candidate is undominated if no other
candidate dominates it.
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Proof: The condition is obviously necessary. Suppose the condition holds on a given profile. We extend this
profile by taking a set of new candidates yij where 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤ K . Consider the i-th vote: if x∗
is ranked in one the top k positions, put all new candidates at the bottom of the vote. Otherwise, introduce the
new candidates {yi1, . . . , yiK} at the top of the vote, and all other new candidates at the bottom. The score of
the new candidates is at most 1, while that of xi 6= x∗ is at most that of x∗ (which is unchanged). 
Note that for K ≥ 2 this condition does not imply that the candidate is undominated (nor vice-versa). It
does obviously when K = 1, i.e., for plurality.
Let us see now how the above results relate to those in [14]. We first note that in the case of the Borda
rule we have the same condition. Indeed one sees intuitively that Lemma 6 tells us that for some voting rules
(including Borda), introducing new candidates in a contiguous manner, as with cloning, is the best thing to do.
For plurality, again the condition is similar in both cases. However, for K-approval as soon as K > 1, the
problem becomes hard in the cloning setting whereas it is easy in our setting with an unbounded number of
new candidates.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we have considered voting situations where new candidates may show up during the process.
This problem increasingly occurs in our societies, as many votes now take place online (through dedicated
platforms, or simply by email exchange) during an extended period of time.
We have identified the computational complexity of computing possible winners for some scoring rules.
Some of them allow polynomial algorithms for the problem (e.g. plurality, 2-approval, Borda, veto) regardless
of the (fixed) number of new candidates showing up. For the rules of the K-approval family, when K ≥ 3, the
problem remains polynomial only if the number of new candidates is at most 2. Finally, we have exhibited a
simple rule where the problem is hard for a single new candidate.
The results address the problem of making some designated candidate a cowinner, which is similar to x
being unique winner under the assumption of the most favourable tie-breaking. In the other extreme case (if
we want x to be a strict winner, i.e., to win regardless of the tie-breaking rule), the results are easily adapted:
for instance, the inequalities in Proposition 1 and 8 become strict. For K-approval, the first condition of
Proposition 2 becomes strict but the second one should now read SK(PX , x) ≥
∑
xi∈X
max(0, SK(PX , xi) −
SK(PX , x) + 1). As for veto, all other initial candidates need to be vetoed at least once. The hardness proofs
can also be readily adapted to the unique winner setting. A more general treatment would require cumbersome
expressions, and is also somewhat problematic since the identities of the new candidates are not known anyway
(making it difficult to specify easily a tie-breaking rule on these candidates).
As for future work, a first direction to follow would be to try to obtain more general results for scoring rules,
as those obtained by Betzler and Dorn [5] for the general version of the possible winner problem. Extending
the study to other families of voting rules, such as rules based on the majority graph, is also worth investigating.
Of course, identifying possible winners is not the end of the story. In practice, as mentioned earlier, one may
for instance also be interested in a refinement of this notion: knowing how likely it is that a given candidate will
win. Another interesting issue consists in designing elicitation protocols when the preferences about the ‘old’
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candidates are already known. In this case, a trade-off occurs between the storage cost and communication
cost, since keeping track of more information is likely to help reduce the burden of elicitation.
Acknowledgements. We are very much indebted to the reviewers of previous versions of this paper for their
extremely detailed and relevant comments.
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